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Abstract
Theoretical research suggests that health expenditure risk can have an ambiguous influence on
the annuitization decisions of the elderly. I provide empirical evidence on this linkage, by
estimating the impact of supplemental Medicare insurance (Medigap) coverage on the annuity
demand of older Americans. I use local variation in prices as an instrumental variable to address
the possible endogeneity of Medigap coverage, an identification strategy motivated by the fact
that Medigap policies are not medically underwritten, and Medigap insurance is required by law
to be standardized, so prices reflect neither individual characteristics nor product quality.
Medigap coverage has a strong impact on annuitization: the extensive margin elasticity is 0.39,
the overall elasticity of private annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage is 0.56. These
results are robust to controls for health, wealth, and preferences, as well as other robustness tests.
They imply that medical expenditure risk has a large impact on underannuitization.
Daniel W. Sacks
The Wharton School of the University of Pennsylvania
dansacks@wharton.upenn.edu
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Health Expenditure Risk and Annuitization:
Evidence from Medigap Coverage
Daniel W. Sacks
How does health insurance affect annuitization? An emerging theoretical literature
explores the impact of medical expenditure risk on annuitization, but there is little consensus on
the quantitative importance of this channel. Using an instrumental variables strategy, this paper
measures the impact of supplemental Medicare insurance—Medigap—on the annuity demand of
the elderly.
The literature on health expenditure risk and annuitization attempts to provide an
explanation for the under-annuitization puzzle. The puzzle is that, while economic theory
suggests strongly that elderly individuals should annuitize much of their wealth (Yaari, 1965;
Davidoff, Brown, and Diamond, 2005), in fact people annuitize little (e.g. Brown 2007). Health
expenditure risk can help resolve this puzzle, since health risk decreases the demand for
annuities by driving up the value of liquidity. If health expenditures require large amounts of
cash-on-hand, then annuities, with their slow and steady payouts, would be unattractive. The
quantitative importance of this channel, however, is unclear. While Turra and Mitchell (2008)
and Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2011a) find that medical expenditure risk may decrease
the demand for annuities, Pashchenko (2010) and Yogo (2011) suggest that this channel is
quantitatively unimportant, and Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2011b) argue that full
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annuitization remains optimal even in the presence of medical expenditure risk. Theory is
therefore ambiguous about the of health expenditure risk for (under-)annuitization.1
Much of what we know about the impact of health risk on annuitization comes from
calibrated or estimated structural models. Solving these models requires making untested
assumptions about the functional forms for utility and for the distribution of medical expenditure
risk. The impact of health expenditure risk on annuitization, in particular, appears to depend on
assumptions about access to credit and about the timing of medical expenditure shocks.
Peijnenburg, Nijman, and Werker (2011b) conclude that if the elderly can borrow against future
annuity income (or save out of current annuity income), then health expenditure risk does not
reduce annuitization. This is not surprising, since with perfect access to credit, annuities are just
as liquid as any other investment.
In this paper, I take an alternative approach to measuring how medical expenditure risk
affects savings: I directly estimate the impact of health insurance on annuity demand. If indeed
medical expenditure risks loom large, then health insurance should complement annuitization. I
focus on Medicare Supplemental Insurance, i.e. Medigap insurance, a regulated health insurance
product that provides extra coverage beyond Medicare. Estimating the impact of Medigap on
savings or annuitization is made difficult by the endogeneity of health insurance. The demand for
insurance depends on wealth, risk preferences, and riskiness, and all of these factors also affect
savings decisions independently. To address these concern, I use an instrumental variables

1

There are of course many other explanations for the under-annuitization puzzle. Finkelstein and Poterba (2004) and
Mitchell et al. (1999) explore adverse selection and insurance loads. Friedman and Warshawksy (1990) and
Lockwood (2012) consider the importance of bequest motives. Chai et al. (2011) consider many sources of risk and
complex portfolio choice. Brown (2001) contends that lifecycle models have difficulty explaining all of annuity
demand, and Brown (2007) therefore argues that psychological factors may contribute to underannuitization. Brown
et al. (2008, 2011) present evidence for a framing explanation of the underannuitization puzzle.

4

strategy, using the zip-code level price of Medigap as an instrument for coverage, conditioning
on extensive controls for health, wealth, and preferences in the Health and Retirement Study.
For this empirical strategy to succeed, I require that Medigap prices, conditional on other
controls, be uncorrelated with underlying determinants of the demand for annuities. The
institutional features of the Medigap market suggest that this condition may be satisfied. By law,
Medigap insurance cannot be medically underwritten for individuals purchasing it at age 65.
Prices in a given year thus may depend only on the buyer’s location, age, and sex. While insurers
might charge prices based on average health in an area, it is plausible to assume that, conditional
on an individual’s own health and sex, the price of health insurance that she faces is uncorrelated
with her underlying annuity demand. The variation in insurance prices underlying my estimates
comes from variation in local spending habits unrelated to the individual’s demand for medical
care. Below I present some evidence verifying this identification assumption, showing that health
insurance prices appear uncorrelated with individual preferences or health, conditional on
demographic variables and permanent income.
Medigap prices, conditional on demographic and other controls, have a very strong
impact on Medigap coverage. Across specifications, I estimate a stable and precise price
elasticity of demand for Medigap coverage of about -1.5, with large F-statistics that allay weak
instrument concerns. The first stage is not robust, however, to controlling for state fixed effects,
because these controls absorb almost all the variation in the instrument. An important weakness
of this empirical strategy, therefore, is that I cannot control for unobserved state-level factors
affecting Medigap prices and annuity or savings demand.
With this concern in mind, I next examine the reduced form relationship between
annuitization, and Medigap prices. Nonparametric estimates of this relationship illustrate the
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variation that underlies the instrumental variables regression. The result show a clear and
negative relationship between Medigap prices and annuitization, measured as either the
probability of having positive pension or annuity income, or as the amount of pension or annuity
income. The instrumental variables estimates quantifying the relationship between Medigap
coverage and annuitization suggest that health insurance has a strong impact on annuitization:
the elasticity of non-Social Security annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage is about
0.56. About two-thirds of the response is on the extensive margin; I estimate an extensive margin
elasticity of about 0.39. Social Security income also responds to Medigap coverage, with an
elasticity of about 0.11. All of these results are robust across a variety of specifications. While
the point estimates are perhaps too large to be believed, they nonetheless indicate an important
role for medical expenditure risk in annuity demand.
The main contribution of this paper, therefore, is to provide direct empirical evidence on
the relationship between annuity demand and medical expenditure risk. It also contributes to the
large literature on precautionary savings among the elderly. Palumbo (1999) and De Nardi,
French, and Jones (2010) showed that medical expenditure risk has a large impact on the savings
among older Americans. Given the importance of medical expenditure risk for overall savings, it
is not surprising that annuitization responds as well.

1.

Background on Medigap Insurance
Elderly Americans in the United States face several sources of medical expenditure risk.

Medicare does not cover long term care, and this shortcoming represents a serious financial risk
to the elderly (cf. Brown and Finkelstein, 2007). Moreover, the health insurance provided by
Medicare is incomplete because of its cost-sharing provisions. Medicare Part A, which covers
hospitalizations, requires patients to pay for the first day of hospitalization, and Part B, which
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covers outpatient services, has a 20 percent coinsurance rate. Medicare did not cover prescription
drugs until the introduction of Part D in 2006, and the standard benefit in Part D today includes
substantial cost sharing with a deductible and a “donut hole” with 100 percent coinsurance rate
for expenditures above a certain amount.
Seniors may buy supplemental insurance to fill in the holes in Medicare’s coverage.
These policies are called Medigap plans and they are tightly regulated by the federal
government. Insurers may offer policies from a menu of 12 standardized plans (denoted by
letters A through N). All plans cover Part A coinsurance and at least part of the Part B
coinsurance, but they differ in their coverage otherwise.2 A key feature of the Medigap market is
that if individuals purchase policies at the time they claim Medicare coverage, then insurers
cannot use medical underwriting. Plans instead are priced on sex and location.3 Many plans are
also priced based on the buyer’s age of purchase, so that individuals have a strong incentive to
purchase a policy at age 65, and the price they face at age 65 is the price they will face for the
rest of their life (if they choose to renew their policies). These plans are called “age-issued.”
Plans can also be “attained-age,” in which case prices vary with age, or “community rated,” in
which case prices do not vary with age, but vary from year to year according to a local risk
rating. I focus on attained-age prices, because these prices at age 65 are likely to have a strong
and lasting influence on Medigap coverage throughout retirement.
Insurers setting these prices are prohibited from underwriting based on individual health
or mortality expectations. The association between local prices at age 65 and long-term Medigap
coverage, and the fact that prices cannot depend on individual-specific health/wealth/mortality,
motivates my instrumental variables identification strategy. Prices in these markets depend
2

For a detailed description of Medigap plans and eligibility/pricing rules, see CMS-NAIC (2012),
http://www.medicare.gov/publications/pubs/pdf/02110.pdf.
3
Plans may also charge different prices to smokers and non-smokers, but this is very rare in practice.
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instead on the underlying area-level demand for Medical care (which I assume derive from from
risk preferences, health, and wealth). Even conditional on an individual’s demand for medical
care, there is substantial variation in prices, since insurance companies cannot perfectly risk
adjust (or price discriminate). This variation is plausibly orthogonal to individual savings
propensities, so it may be useful as an instrument.

2.

Data: Weiss Ratings and the Health and Retirement Study
The data for this study come from two sources: the Health and Retirement Study

conducted by the University of Michigan, and a proprietary insurance pricing database created
by Weiss Ratings, Inc. The HRS provides information on demographics, preferences, wealth,
annuitization, and insurance coverage. I merge the HRS data at the zip code level to the
insurance pricing information.
2.1 Weiss Ratings Data
Weiss Ratings is a market research firm that collects Medigap pricing information from
firms in most states. Their dataset contains pricing information at the level of year-zip code-firmplan letter, for 1998-2004. For every zip code it is possible to see every plan offered and the
prices charged by each company. There is a fair amount of price dispersion within zip code, as
Maestas, Schroeder and Goldman (2007) show, but very little dispersion in mean price across zip
codes within a state (given plan characteristics). Although in principle, prices can differ by sex,
in practice mean prices for men and women are extremely highly correlated within zip code
(

. Prices are also very highly autocorrelated over time.
I take the price of Medigap insurance as the mean within-zip code price of an attained-

age Plan A policy, allowing prices to differ by sex. There is little lost by using mean Plan A price
rather than different plans, or some combination of plan prices, since the prices are highly
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correlated. For example, the correlation between Plan A and Plan F prices is 0.95. Since the age
65 price determines the path of future prices, I use the mean price in an individual’s zip code
when she turns 65.
From the analysis, I exclude Massachusetts, Minnesota, and Wisconsin because these
states have their own set of Medigap plans, so the prices and policies are not comparable to those
in other states. I exclude Connecticut, Maine, New Jersey, and New York because they lack ageissued policies in the Weiss data. I also lack data on Arizona and Vermont for 2002-2004, and on
Washington for 1999 and 2002-2004, but when I do have data for those states, I include them in
the analysis.
2.2 Health and Retirement Study
The Health and Retirement Study is a longitudinal survey following older Americans. It
began in 1992, collecting detailed information about work, health, and wealth for a
representative sample of the cohort born between 1931 and 1941; this is the original “HRS”
cohort. In subsequent years, the study added additional cohorts born later and earlier; my
analysis here focuses only on heads of household from the original HRS cohort. The HRS offers
a wider range of variables than other longitudinal datasets like the PSID or NLS, and these extra
variables are essential to the present study. The HRS asks about pension and annuity income, and
Social Security income. Pension and annuity income consists of all income from private
annuities or employer-provided pensions, including both defined-benefit and definedcontribution pensions. These variables are the main outcomes of interest. I also make use of the
HRS’s extensive health and preference information as additional controls.
The analysis sample is restricted to heads of household age 65 or older with Medicare
coverage not covered by employer-provided health insurance. This sample definition follows
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Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008), who study Medigap demand extensively; like them, I
exclude 2,352 observations of 553 people with employer-provided health insurance because I
expect Medigap coverage to be superfluous for these people. I also exclude individuals with
imputed values for pension/annuity income or for any assets, and people with missing values for
any of the outcomes or controls.4 The final sample has 3,335 observations of 1,406 people.
Table 1 shows summary statistics on the key variables for the full sample and for the
analysis sample. All dollar amounts are in 2010-constant dollars. I present summary statistics
separately by whether the respondent has Medigap coverage, defined as having supplemental
insurance and receiving Medicare (again following Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008). About
one-third of the sample have purchased Medigap policies. Relative to the uncovered, people with
Medigap coverage generally face lower Medigap prices, as expected. The covered group is also
to be female, have fewer children, to be white, and have much higher permanent income, defined
as average income over the pre-retirement period. (De Nardi, French, and Jones (2010) and
Carroll and Samwick (1997) use a similar permanent income concept.) People with supplemental
insurance coverage are healthier than those without: they are more likely to report being in good
health, and they suffer less from many chronic diseases. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008)
explore this advantageous selection in detail. People with Medigap are more likely to have
annuity income, have more annuity income, and have higher savings than people without.

3.

Empirical strategy and first stage results

3.1 Empirical Strategy
In what follows, I use local price variation in Medigap policies as an instrument for
Medigap coverage, conditioning on the individual-level characteristics that might affect savings
4

In results not reported, I experimented with including individuals with imputed values. In all cases, I found slightly
stronger impacts of Medigap on annuitization.
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decisions and correlate with local prices. To see why this strategy is necessary, and why it might
be successful, let
and let

be the outcome of interest (savings or annuitization) for individual at age
indicate Medigap coverage at

I assume these variables are related as

follows:
(

(1)
(2)

The object of interest is , the impact of

on annuitization. Annuitization decisions,

however, depend not only on health insurance coverage but also on wealth, preferences (i.e. risk
aversion and the intertemporal elasticity of substitution), and health and mortality expectations.
But since individuals choose whether to purchase insurance,

depends on these

variables as well, creating an endogeneity problem.
Using local Medigap prices as an instrumental variable potentially overcomes this
problem, since identification comes from variation in insurance prices that is plausibly
orthogonal to individual wealth, preferences, or health. That is, insurance prices are a function of
aggregate (zip-code) level variables only. These variables likely include aggregate (determinants
of) demand for medical care (and also medical care costs, administrative costs, and market
structure in the Medigap industry). Because similar individuals—individuals with the same
underlying demand for savings products—can live in zip codes with very different demands for
medical care, there is a great deal of variation in the price of Medigap coverage, even conditional
on savings propensities. Local prices can therefore isolate variation in Medigap coverage,
independent of savings attitudes.
One concern in using cross zip-code variation in Medigap prices, however, is that these
prices may be systematically correlated with zip-code level characteristics that directly affect
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savings behavior.5 For example, it may be that areas in which people have unusually high
medical expenses have both high Medigap prices and high savings. In principle, people might
decide to live in a given zip code because it has low Medigap prices. Here the control variables
are useful: the threat to identification comes from the correlation between prices and individual
health, wealth, and preferences. But using the rich HRS data, I can condition on these variables.
To the extent that the results are robust to these controls, it is unlikely that additional unobserved
determinants of savings or annuity demand are also correlated with local prices. The instrumental
variables estimator therefore relies on variation in prices across people with similar
characteristics to identify the impact of insurance on savings or annuitization.
In what follows, I show that, conditional on demographics and permanent income,
Medigap prices are uncorrelated with health and preferences. These results provide some
reassurance of the validity of the instrument, since these prices appear uncorrelated with many
individual-level determinants of savings and annuity demand. One remaining concern, though, is
that high Medigap prices could reflect high administrative costs for insurance companies in that
region, and therefore high prices might also signal high annuity prices (i.e. low returns); if so,
this could bias estimates towards finding a positive impact of Medigap coverage on
annuitization.
Two considerations cast doubt on this possibility. First, in their analysis of annuity
premiums from a single large UK insurer in the 1980s and 1990s, Finkelstein and Poterba (2004)
report that firms set geographically uniform prices, despite important variation in mortality
across regions. This fact suggests that annuity premiums are not likely to be systematically
higher in areas with high Medigap prices. It is not clear, however, whether the experience of that
5

Local prices can affect annuity or savings demand through income effects as well as substitution effects, but for
my purposes this distinction is irrelevant: all that matters is that the prices alone (and not some omitted variable) is
affecting annuity or savings.
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firm generalizes to the United States in the 1990s and 2000s.6Sstate-level data on annuity prices
would let me address this concern directly, but I am unaware of any such data. As a second piece
of evidence, I use premium data for several annuity providers collected in 1995 by A.M. Best
(examined by Mitchell et al., 1999). I match this pricing information to the provider’s state (as
listed by A.M. Best in their ratings) and correlate annuity premiums with state average Medigap
premiums (in 1998, the earliest year for which I have data). This exercise reveals that the
correlation between the price of a $10/month annuity and state Medigap price is virtually nil (0.04). This procedure is of course far from perfect, but it suggests there is very little geographic
correlation between Medigap prices and annuity premiums.
3.2 First Stage Results
Table 2 presents the first stage estimates of equation (2). Each column presents the
estimate

obtained from using a different set of controls, as well as the F-statistic on

which provides a test of instrument strength. Column (1) reports estimates of

,

obtained with a

basic set of controls: year fixed effects, a quartic in age, and indicators for race, sex, marital
status, educational attainment (high school, some college, and college or more), and dummy
variables for having one, two, or three or more children. These controls serve two functions.
First, the year and age controls and the sex dummy are directly correlated with Medigap prices,
since prices are set yearly and have increased over time. To the extent that there are differences
in annuity demand by age, year, or sex, it is therefore important to control for these variables.
Second, the demographic variables are closely related to lifetime earnings potential and savings
demand, and this may have a large impact on both savings and demand for medical care (through

6

Finkelstein and Poterba (2004, pp. 190-1) write, “…like other firms in the market, [the firm we study] varies the
annuity price on the basis of only age and gender, and not on the basis of the individual’s geographic location,”
suggesting that this pricing practice is common at least in the UK.
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income effects). Controlling for these variables helps control for the correlation between local
demand for medical care (which influences Medigap prices) and own demand for annuities.
The coefficient on

(

is -0.48 and, with a standard error of 0.06; it is precisely

estimated and highly statistically significant. Here and throughout, all standard errors are
clustered at the individual level since I pool multiple years of data for each individual. The Fstatistic on log-price is 59.4, alleviating concern about a possible weak instrument. The sample
mean of

is 0.33, implying an average elasticity of about -1.5, somewhat larger than

Starc’s (2012) estimate of an own price elasticity of demand for Medigap plans of about -1.1.
Figure 1 provides the graphical analog of the first stage relationship. The figure shows
the non-parametric relationship between Medigap coverage and Medigap price, both net of
controls. To construct the figure, I regress Medigap coverage and

on the age, year, and

demographic controls (separately), form the residuals, and then estimate a local linear regression
of residual Medigap coverage on residual

; this is exactly the variation underlying the

first stage regression. As the Figure shows, there is a clear negative relationship between
Medigap coverage and its price. This relationship seems to level off for a range of prices before
declining.
While the basic controls adjust for standard demographic differences across people, they
may still control inadequately for aspects of insurance demand that are also correlated with local
prices. Column (2) adds controls for permanent income: a cubic in the log of permanent income,
plus log permanent income interacted with age. One concern with the identification strategy is
that, because health care and savings are normal goods, high-income areas will have high savings
and high Medigap prices. Controlling for permanent income addresses this concern, and since
the estimate of

hardly changes, there is little evidence that own permanent income is closely
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related to Medigap demand or prices. Permanent income is perhaps an indirect measure of
lifetime wealth, but controlling for wealth directly would be inappropriate since wealth is an
outcome of interest. Nonetheless, in results not reported here, I control for wealth at age 65
rather than permanent income; the estimates are very similar. In the robustness section below, I
also control for pre-retirement wealth, and again the results are confirmed.
The next two columns control for health and then preferences more directly. Column (3)
adds indicators for health status (excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor), as well as indicators
for ever having one of several chronic diseases or medical conditions (high blood pressure,
diabetes, cancer, lung disease, heart disease, stroke, or arthritis). Column (4) controls explicitly
for the HRS’s measures of risk preferences and mortality expectancy. The risk preference
measures are the average value of risk tolerance implied by a person’s answer, over several
rounds, to questions about large hypothetical gambles (Barksy et al., 1997.) Controlling for risk
preferences can be important if area-level variation in risk preferences induces low Medigap
prices while simultaneously inducing high annuitization. Fang, Keane, and Silverman (2008)
demonstrate that advantageous selection is an important feature of the Medigap market. As
columns (3) and (4) show, the first stage results are virtually unchanged by introducing these
controls.
The first stage results are therefore highly robust to controlling for individual-level
factors that might be correlated with insurance prices while directly affecting savings. The main
results are similarly robust, as I show below. However, to the extent that permanent area-level
differences in preferences or health may be driving differences in prices across areas, the most
direct control is simply to include state (or zip code) fixed effects. As Maestas, Schroeder and
Goldman (2007) show, however, most of the geographic variation in Medigap prices is between
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(rather than within) states; controlling for state fixed effects eliminates almost all the variation in
prices. Controlling for state fixed effects shows this clearly: the coefficient on log price falls and
its standard error increases. These state fixed effects eliminate the first stage relationship because
there is no variation remaining to (precisely) identify . Indeed, if I regress the instrument on the
other controls, I obtain an

of 0.91, but when I include state fixed effects, the

rises to 0.97,

implying that the state fixed effects absorb about two-thirds the remaining variation in the
instrument. Since the first stage F-statistics are so low, state fixed effects cannot be used.
3.3 Assessing instrument validity
The first stage results are essentially unchanged when additional controls are included for
permanent income, health status, and preferences. This robustness provides a first hint that the
instrument may be valid: since these controls do not affect the first stage estimate of , either
they are uncorrelated with Medigap coverage, or they are uncorrelated with

. To the

extent that observable determinants of savings and annuitization are uncorrelated with the
instrument, it is likely that the unobservables are also uncorrelated.
Table 3 presents direct evidence that the instrument is uncorrelated with these additional
controls. Each column of the table reports estimates from a regression of

on the

indicated controls; F-statistics test that the indicated set of controls is jointly equal to zero.
Column (1) again has only the basic controls; here we see, as expected, that the year and age
controls are highly correlated with Medigap prices. The race indicators and education year fixed
effects are also significantly correlated. Sex is, somewhat surprisingly, uncorrelated with price,
while the children dummies are at most weakly correlated. Column (2) adds controls for
permanent income, which is correlated with the instrument. In regressions below, controlling for
permanent income does not affect results because permanent income turns out not to be closely
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correlated with annuitization, conditional on the demographic variables. Column (3) adds
controls for self-reported health status and for chronic diseases. Health appears uncorrelated with
prices. Finally, Column (4) controls for self-assessed mortality and risk tolerance. These
preference variables are also uncorrelated with the instrument.
In sum, the instrument is largely uncorrelated with health, or preferences, conditional on
basic demographics and permanent income, although there is some correlation between local
prices and indicators for having chronic disease. These results may ease concern that the
instrument might be systematically correlated with unobserved determinants of savings or
annuitization.

4.

Medigap coverage increases annuitization
I now turn to estimating the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization. I begin with

income from private (i.e. non-Social Security) pension and annuity income, looking first at the
probability of having any pension or annuity income, and then the amount of yearly pension and
annuity income. When I look at the amount of pension income, I work in levels despite the
skewness of the data because many people have zero income. The results in logs are highly
imprecise. I exclude Social Security income because over 90% of the sample has positive Social
Security income, making it difficult to detect any effect on the extensive margin. Nonetheless,
people can increase their Social Security income by claiming later (as well as other
mechanisms), so I examine the impact of Medigap coverage on Social Security income receipt.
Table 4 shows the impact of Medigap coverage on the probability of having positive
pension or annuity income, estimated with a linear probability model.9 Panel A provides the
reduced form result, where the coefficient on
9

The marginal effects of
coefficients, however.

is obtained by regressing an indicator for

implied by probit estimates (not reported) are very similar to the reduced-form
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positive pension or annuity income on

and the indicated controls. The coefficient on

is a statistically significant -0.20, indicating that increasing the price of Medigap
coverage by 10 percent would reduce the annuitization rate by about two percentage points.
Figure 2, constructed analogously to Figure 1, illustrates the reduced form relationship between
annuitization coverage and prices: it shows the nonparametric fit between (the residual)
annuitization probability and (residual) prices (net of controls). There is a clear negative
relationship, although it is not as precise as the first stage relationship.
Panel B of Table 4 presents the instrumental variables estimate of

, the impact of

Medigap coverage on annuitization, estimated via two stage least squares with

as the

excluded instrument. The coefficient is 0.41. To interpret this number, it is helpful to calculate
the elasticity of (aggregate) annuitization it implies. With mean Medigap coverage of 0.33 and
mean annuitization probability of 0.35, the elasticity of annuitization with respect to Medigap
coverage is about 0.39. A policy change that increases Medigap coverage by 10 percent would
increase the probability of having private pension or annuity income by about 4 percent.
Columns (2), (3), and (4) include successively more controls, and results change very
little. The point estimates fall by two percentage points when controlling for permanent income,
and a further two when controlling for the health variables. Controlling for preferences has no
further impact on the estimate. This suggest that Medigap coverage appears to have a large and
robust positive impact on annuitization.
These results, of course, reflect only the extensive margin, that is, whether people have
any private annuity income at all. Equally important is the intensive margin—the amount of
income derived from private annuities and pensions. Table 5 shows the impact of Medigap
coverage on average annuity income. Increases in annuity income reflect both intensive and
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extensive margin responses and therefore summarize the overall impact of Medigap on the
demand for annuity income. Figure 3 illustrates this relationship graphically, showing the
relationship (net of age, year, and demographic controls) between private pension or annuity
income and

.

The reduced form results in Panel A indicate a strong inverse relationship between
Medigap prices and annuity income. Increasing Medigap prices by 10 percent reduces annuity
income by about $550, relative to an annual mean of about $6,300. This number is fairly
consistent across specifications, although including health or preference controls reduces it
slightly. The instrumental variables results in Panel B yield a point estimate of $9,500-11,600,
with a fairly wide confidence interval. Since mean annuity income is about $6,200, these point
estimates imply an overall elasticity of annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage of
about 0.56. Comparing this to the extensive margin elasticity implies that about perhaps seventy
percent of the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization comes from the extensive margin,
and the remainder from the extensive margin.
Figure 4 turns to the impact of Medigap coverage on Social Security income, plotting the
reduced form relationship between Social Security income and Medigap prices. The figure
shows a negative relationship between Medigap prices and Social Security income, especially at
high prices. Table 6 quantifies this relationship. The reduced form results in Panel A of table 6
indicate an average slope of -1,900, with additional controls attenuating this relationship
somewhat. The instrumental variables results in Panel B indicate that Medigap coverage
increases Social Security income by $3,600-$4,000.The implied elasticity of Social Security
income is about 0.11.
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Social Security benefits are a function of lifetime earnings, claiming age, and work
experience post-claiming.10 Since I condition on permanent income, Medigap coverage can
affect Social Security income primarily by encouraging people to claim benefits at older ages. In
results not detailed here, I examine the impact of Medigap coverage on the age of claiming,
defined as the age in which a person first reports positive Social Security results. The results are
imprecise but indicate that Medigap coverage raises the claiming age by about two-thirds of a
year, relative to a mean of 64.3. During the sample period, delaying claiming raises future
benefits by about 7 percent, so either the impact of Medigap on Social Security claiming is
concentrated among high-income earners, or Medigap affects claiming through channels other
than claiming age. In particular, the Earnings Test can affect benefits in complex ways, reducing
them in years with high earnings, but increasing them after the Normal Retirement Age.

5.

Robustness: Controlling for pre-determined endogenous variables
I have shown that the impact of Medigap coverage on annuity demand is robust to

extensive controls for income, health, and preferences. Nonetheless, it is possible that the
instrument remains correlated with unobserved determinants of savings or annuity demand. In
this section, I explore the robustness of my main results to additional controls.
One threat to identification comes from a possible correlation between own medical
expenditures and area medical expenditures. If own medical expenditures and annuity or savings
demand are also negatively correlated, then the instrumental variables results will be biased
upward. Such a correlation could arise if people with low discount factors, present-biased
preferences, or high mortality expectations underinvest in health when young; when old, they
would have high health expenditures and little demand for savings. If people sorted across areas
10

Friedberg (1998) provides detailed explanation of the relationship between claiming age and benefits. Because of
the Social Security Earnings Test, an individual with sufficiently high earnings after claiming benefits loses her
benefits in the year with high earnings, but this is offset by higher benefits after she reaches Normal Retirement Age.
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on the basis of demand for medical care, then there would be a positive correlation between own
health expenditures and aggregate expenditures, and hence also Medigap prices.
A natural way to address this issue is to simply control directly for individual-level
medical expenditures. A problem with this approach is that medical expenditures depend on
insurance coverage, so controlling for medical expenditures may absorb part of the effect of
Medigap coverage. As a partial solution, I control for mean out-of-pocket expenditures prior to
age 65, since these expenditures are likely unaffected by Medigap prices. It is possible that in
areas with high prices, people use employer-provided health insurance more intensively
immediately before retiring. This seems unlikely, however, since Card, Dobkin and Maestas
(2009) show that medical care utilization increases discontinuously at age 65, when people
become eligible for Medicare, suggesting that people typically delay treatment until after
retiring. If pre-retirement demand for healthcare when young (conditional on observables)
reflects the unobservable determinants of demand for healthcare while old, then these health
expenditures proxy for unobservables.
A second way to address this problem is to control for pre-retirement savings, again using
pre-determined endogenous variables as a proxy for the unobserved determinants of savings and
annuity demand. Here assets are defined as total net assets including savings, real estate, and
businesses, but not the asset value of pensions or annuity holdings. This approach suffers from
the same problem as using pre-retirement health expenditures: people may save before retirement
in anticipation of wanting more precautionary wealth after retirement.

Because of these

endogeneity problems, I view these additional control variables as robustness checks rather than
preferred specifications.
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Table 7 shows the results of controlling for these pre-retirement endogenous variables in
addition to the basic set of controls. Column (1) presents results for the probability of having
private pension or annuity income; Column (2) shows results for the level of pension/annuity
income, and Column (3) reports results for Social Security income. For comparison, I also report
baseline results. The point estimates are essentially unchanged for private annuities when
controlling for medical expenditures; if anything, this strengthens the estimated impact of
Medigap coverage on annuity income. Controlling for assets has a similarly small impact on the
point estimates, and controlling for both assets and expenditures simultaneously also does not
affect estimates. The point estimates for Social Security income do respond to the additional
controls, falling (in absolute value) with controls for medical spending but rising with controls
for pre-retirement wealth, with little net impact. Even taking the smallest point estimates (in
absolute value), there still remains an important role for Medigap coverage in affecting annuity
decisions. Overall, then, my findings are robust to the inclusion of these pre-retirement variables,
and to the extent that these variables proxy for unobserved determinants of savings or
annuitization demand, they suggest that correlation between the instrument and unobservables do
not drive the results.

6.

Conclusions
This paper examined the impact of Medigap coverage on annuitization and savings

decisions, using local prices of Medigap coverage as an instrument for coverage. I found that that
Medigap coverage has a large impact on annuitization, with an aggregate elasticity of private
annuity income with respect to Medigap coverage of about 0.56. About 70 percent of this effect
operates through the extensive margin. Medigap coverage also appears to induce higher Social
Security income, with an elasticity of about 0.11.
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While the results are robust to extensive individual-level controls for income, health, and
preferences, I cannot control for state-level factors affecting insurance prices and savings
demand. One such factor is that medical expenditure risk may vary at the state level because of
differences in physician behavior (e.g. Gottlieb et al. 2010). To the extent that this risk variation
drives annuitization or savings decisions, then our results here may be biased upward -- although
they would still support the view that medical expenditure risk has a large impact on
annuitization decisions. An alternative threat to identification is that state-level differences in
wealth or prudence might boost the demand for medical care, driving up Medigap prices, and
hence have a direct effect on annuity demand. The variables used here can only imperfectly
control for these differences in lifetime wealth and preferences, and so this concern remains.
Nonetheless, my results suggest that medical expenditure risk may be an important part of the
underannuitization puzzle, as people hold their wealth in a liquid form in order to finance
unexpected health care needs.
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Table 1: Summary Statistics
All

Medigap
No Medigap
0.33
--(0.47)
Price of Medigap
1030
980
1055
(dollars/year)
(275)
(259)
(278)
Female (%)
0.51
0.57
0.48
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.50)
Age (%)
69.2
69.4
69.0
(2.7)
(2.6)
(2.8)
Black (%)
0.10
0.03
0.15
(0.31)
(0.17)
(0.35)
Married (%)
0.50
0.54
0.48
(0.50)
(0.50)
(0.50)
Number of children
3.32
3.06
3.45
(2.11)
(1.96)
(2.17)
Excellent/very good
0.36
0.42
0.33
health (%)
(0.48)
(0.49)
(0.47)
Ever high blood
0.60
0.61
0.60
pressure (%)
(0.49)
(0.49)
(0.49)
Ever diabetes (%)
0.24
0.20
0.25
(0.43)
(0.40)
(0.44)
Ever cancer (%)
0.16
0.16
0.17
(0.37)
(0.36)
(0.37)
Ever lung disease (%)
0.14
0.11
0.16
(0.35)
(0.31)
(0.37)
Ever heart disease (%)
0.27
0.28
0.27
(0.44)
(0.45)
(0.44)
Ever stroke (%)
0.08
0.07
0.09
(0.27)
(0.25)
(0.28)
Ever arthritis (%)
0.68
0.67
0.68
(0.47)
(0.47)
(0.47)
Permanent income
73.0
87.1
66.1
(thousands $/year)
(93.6)
(95.9)
(91.8)
Has pension or annuity
0.35
0.39
0.33
income (%)
(0.48)
(0.49)
(0.47)
Private pension/annuity
6.34
6.76
6.14
inc (thousands $/year)
(26.6)
(24.67)
(27.6)
Has Social Security
0.95
0.98
0.93
Income (%)
(0.22)
(0.13)
(0.25)
Social Security Income
11.3
12.5
10.7
(thousands $/year)
(5.40)
(5.06)
(5.46)
N People
1406
348
1058
N Observations
3335
994
2341
Notes: Table shows mean and, in parentheses, the standard deviation of selected variables, for the analysis sample
and by Medigap coverage status.
Has Medigap (%)
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Table 2: First Stage Results
Dependent Var.:
Has Medigap
Coefficient on
log(Medigap
price)
F-Statistic
Controls for:
Age quartic
Year FEs
Demographics
Permanent inc.
Health
Preferences
State FEs

(1)
Basic
-0.48***
(0.06)
0.16
67.7

Yes
Yes
Yes

(2)
Permanent income
-0.47***
(0.06)
0.18
65.3

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)
Health
-0.47***
(0.06)

(4)
Preferences
-0.47***
(0.06)

(5)
State FEs
-0.09
(0.09)

0.19
68.4

0.19
66.7

0.26
1.0

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: Table shows the results of regressing Medigap coverage on the log of price, plus the indicated controls. The
price is the zipcode-average price of plan A coverage in effect the year of turning 65. See the text for a definition of
the sample. The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals. Demographic controls are a quartic in
age, plus dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more),
married, and number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of
permanent income (average income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age.
The health controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported
health status. The preference controls are controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical
significance, with *: p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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Table 3: Tests of instrument validity
F-statistic for test of
joint significance:
Year Fixed Effects
Age trend
Children dummies
Female Indicator
Black
Educational
attainment
Permanent income

(1)
Basic
454
(0.00)
639
(0.00)
1.05
(0.37)
5.11
(0.02)
4.47
(0.02)
2.14
(0.09)

(2)
Permanent income
452
(0.00)
164
(0.00)
1.07
(0.36)
5.74
(0.02)
3.34
(0.07)
1.88
(0.13)
4.88
(0.00)

(3)
Health
426
(0.00)
164
(0.00)
0.90
(0.44)
4.08
(0.04)
3.57
(0.06)
1.73
(0.16)
4.70
(0.00)
0.67
(0.61)
1.29
(0.22)

(4)
Preferences
424
(0.00)
166
(0.00)
0.95
(0.41)
5.10
(0.02)
2.20
(0.14)
1.51
(0.21)
4.85
(0.00)
0.70
(0.59)
1.33
(0.20)
1.82
(0.16)
0.17
(0.68)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Health Status
indicators
Chronic disease
indicators
Self-assessed
mortality
Risk Tolerance

Controls for:
Age quartic
Year FEs
Demographics
Permanent income
Health
Preferences

Note: The table is constructed by regressing log Medigap price on the indicated controls. Demographic controls are
dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), and
number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent
income (average income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health
controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status.
The preference terms control for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. The price is the
zipcode-average price of Medigap plan A coverage in effect the year of turning 65. The table reports F-statistics of
the test that the coefficients on the indicated controls are jointly equal to zero, with p-values in parentheses. See the
text for a definition of the sample. The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals.
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Table 4: Impact of Medigap on probability of having private pension or annuity income
Dependent Var.:
Has private pension
or annuity income

(1)
Basic

(2)
Permanent income

(3)
Health

(4)
Preferences

Coefficient on
log(Medigap
price)

-0.20***
(0.07)

Panel A: Reduced Form
-0.18**
(0.07)

-0.17**
(0.07)

-0.17**
(0.07)

Coefficient on
Medigap

0.41**
(0.17)

Panel B: IV Results
0.39**
(0.17)

0.37**
(0.16)

0.37**
(0.16)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Controls for:
Age quartic
Year FEs
Demographics
Permanent inc.
Health
Preferences

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: Table shows the linear-probability model instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage
on the probability of having positive income from pension or annuities. The mean of the dependent variable is 0.35,
and its standard deviation is 0.48. The excluded instrument is the log of Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in
Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log price is reported in panel A. Additional controls are included as
indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals.
Demographic controls are dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college,
college or more), and number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the
log of permanent income (average income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and
age. The health controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for selfreported health status. The preference controls are controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk
tolerance. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate
statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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Table 5: Impact of Medigap on pension / annuity income
Dependent Var.:
private pension or
annuity income
($ thousands)
Coefficient on
log(Medigap
price)
Coefficient on
Medigap
Controls for:
Age quartic
Year FEs
Demographics
Permanent inc.
Health
Preferences

(1)
Basic

(2)
Permanent income

Panel A: Reduced Form
-5.57**
-5.22**
(2.74)
(2.63)

11.6**
(5.85)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Panel B: IV Results
11.2*
(5.83)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)
Health

(4)
Preferences

-4.45*
(2.38)

-4.68*
(2.39)

9.48*
(5.19)

10.35*
(5.29)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: Table shows the model instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage on income from
pension or annuities. The mean of the dependent variable is 6.34, and it standard deviation is 5.85. The excluded
instrument is the log of Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log
price is reported in panel AAdditional controls are included as indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample.
The sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1,406 individuals. Demographic controls are dummies for female,
black, married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), and number of children (one,
two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent income (average income before
retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health controls add a set of dummy
variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. The preference controls are
controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, **
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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Table 6: Impact of Medigap coverage on Social Security Income
Dependent Var.:
Social Security income
($ thousands)
Coefficient on
log(Medigap price)
Coefficient on
Medigap
Controls for:
Age quartic
Year FEs
Demographics
Permanent inc.
Health
Preferences

(1)
Basic

(2)
Permanent income

Panel A: Reduced Form
-1.92***
-1.73**
(0.73)
(0.68)
Panel B: IV Results
4.01***
3.72**
(1.54)
(1.51)

Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

(3)
Health

(4)
Preferences

-1.70**
(0.68)

-1.68**
(0.68)

3.61**
(1.47)

3.59**
(1.48)

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes

Note: Table shows the instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage on the indicated
outcomes. The mean of the dependent variable is 11.3, and its standard deviation is 5.40. The excluded instrument is
the log of Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log price is
reported in panel A. Additional controls are included as indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. The
sample consists of 3,335 observations of 1406 individuals. Demographic controls are dummies for female, black,
married, educational attainment (high school, some college, college or more), and number of children (one, two, or
three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent income (average income before
retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health controls add a set of dummy
variables for several chronic conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. The preference controls are
controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance. Heteroskedasticity-robust standard
errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, **
p<0.05, and *** p<0.01.
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Table 7: Robustness to Pre-determined endogenous variables
(1)
Controls:
Outcome:

Original
Controls
Add OOP
expenditures
Add ln(savings)
Both both

Original
Controls
Add OOP
expenditures
Add ln(savings)
Both both

Has private
pension income
(%)

(2)
Basic controls
Private pension
income
(thousands $)

-0.20***
(0.07)
-0.20***
(0.08)
-0.20***
(0.07)
0.20***
(0.07)

-5.22**
(2.63)
-5.94**
(2.75)
-5.58**
(2.74)
-5.94**
(2.75)

0.41***
(0.17)
0.41***
(0.17)
0.41***
(0.17)
0.41***
(0.17)

11.2*
(5.83)
12.48**
(5.95)
11.67**
(5.87)
12.47**
(5.95)

(3)

(4)

Social Security
Has private
Income
pension income
(thousands $)
(%)
Panel A: Reduced Form
-1.92***
-0.17**
(0.73)
(0.07)
-1.69**
-0.17**
(0.74)
(0.07)
-1.91***
-0.17**
(0.72)
(0.07)
-1.69**
-0.17**
(0.73)
(0.07)
Panel B: Instrumental Variables
4.01***
0.37**
(1.54)
(0.16)
3.56**
0.36**
(1.56)
(0.17)
3.99***
0.35**
(1.52)
(0.16)
3.56**
0.35**
(1.54)
(0.17)

(5)
All controls
Private pension
income
(thousands $)

(6)
Social Security
Income
(thousands $)

-4.68*
(2.39)
-4.94**
(2.42)
-4.73**
(2.39)
-4.97**
(2.41)

-1.68**
(0.68)
-1.55**
(0.69)
-1.67**
(0.68)
-1.55**
(0.69)

9.48*
(5.19)
10.6**
(5.38)
10.2*
(5.44)
10.8*
(5.53)

3.59**
(1.48)
3.31**
(1.51)
3.81**
(1.48)
3.52**
(1.50)

Controls For:
Age quartic
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Year FEs
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Demographics
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Yes
Permanent inc.
Yes
Yes
Yes
Health
Yes
Yes
Yes
Note: Table shows the instrumental variables estimate of the impact of Medigap coverage on the indicated outcome. The excluded instrument is the log of
Medigap price; its coefficient is reported in Panel B, and the reduced form coefficient on log price is reported in panel A. Additional controls are included as
indicated. See the text for a definition of the sample. Demographic controls are dummies for female, black, married, educational attainment (high school, some
college, college or more), and number of children (one, two, or three plus). The permanent income control is a cubic in the log of permanent income (average
income before retirement), plus an interaction between log permanent income and age. The health controls add a set of dummy variables for several chronic
conditions, plus indicators for self-reported health status. The preference controls are controls for subjective mortality expectations and subjective risk tolerance.
Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors, clustered on individuals, are in parentheses. Asterisks indicate statistical significance, with *: p<0.1, ** p<0.05, and
*** p<0.01.
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Figure 1: First-stage relationship between Medigap coverage and its price, in logs, net of basic
controls
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Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and Medigap coverage, net of
controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. The figure is
constructed in three steps. First, I regress Medigap coverage and log Medigap price (separately) on controls for age,
year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I estimate a local linear regression
of residual Medigap on residual log price. I plot the fitted values from this regression.
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Figure 2: Reduced-form relationship between Pr(pension/annuity income) and log(Medigap
price), net of basic controls
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Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and an indicator for having
private pension or annuity income, net of controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95%
confidence interval. The figure is constructed in three steps. First, I regress the indicator and log Medigap price
(separately) on controls for age, year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I
estimate a local linear regression of the residual indicator on residual log price. I plot the fitted values from this
regression.
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Figure 3: Reduced-form relationship between pension/annuity income and log(Medigap price),
net of basic controls
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Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and private pension/annuity
income, net of controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. The
figure is constructed in three steps. First, I regress private pension/annuity income and log Medigap price
(separately) on controls for age, year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I
estimate a local linear regression of residual private pension/annuity income on residual log price. I plot the fitted
values from this regression.
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Figure 4: Reduced-form relationship between Social Security income and log(Medigap price),
net of basic controls
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Notes: This figure plots the local polynomial (degree 1) fit between log Medigap price and Social Security income,
net of controls for age, year, and demographics. The dashed lines show the 95% confidence interval. The figure is
constructed in three steps. First, I regress Social Security income and log Medigap price (separately) on controls for
age, year, and demographics. Second, I form the residuals from this regression. Third, I estimate a local linear
regression of residual Social Security Income on residual log price. I plot the fitted values from this regression.
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